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Marine Bank v. Weaver: New Guidance
On What Is Not A Security
By M. Thomas Arnold
INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court recently
ecided Marine Bank v Weaver,' involving the
efinition of a "security" for purposes of §10 (b) of
ie Securities Exchange Act of 1934.2 While the
pinion is reasonably brief,3 the case may aid
kwyers in determining whether a particular trans-
ction involves a security.4
This article includes a discussion of the defini-
on of the term "security" in various securities
iws, the Howey test, two prior Supreme Court
ecisions, and the Marine Bank case, which is
ummarized and commented upQn. The signif-
:ance of Marine Bank lies in its focus on the
inguage preceding and overriding the statutory
efinition of a "security" if "the context otherwise
equires." The case puts some meat on the bones
f this skeletal language.
I. THE SIMILARITY OF THE
STATUTORY DEFINITIONS OF
"SECURITY"
The definitions of "security" found in the
ecurities Act of 1933- and the Securities Exchange
Lct of 19346 are very similar. Thus, any inter-
retation of the term under the Securities Ex-
hange Act of 1934 carries substantial weight in
iterpreting the term for Securities Act of 1933
urposes, and vice versa.7 In addition, the defini-
ons of "security" under these two federal laws
re similar to the definition found in the Uniform
ecurities Act.8 This is not coincidental."
In sum, "[wihile there are some differences, the
basic definition of a security under the Securities
Act, the Exchange Act, and state blue sky laws is
the same."' 0
II. THE HOWEY TEST
The term "security" has long been accorded a
broad interpretation under both federal and state
securities laws. In particular, the catch-all phrase
"investment contract," found in the definition of
securities under all these laws, has been utilized to
fulfill the remedial purposes of the acts. The
Supreme Court has stated that
the reach of the [Securities Act] does not stop
with the obvious and commonplace. Novel,
uncommon, or irregular devices, whatever
they appear to be, are also reached if it be
proved as matter of fact that they were widely
offered or dealt in under terms or courses of
dealing which established their character in
commerce as 'investment contracts,' or as 'any
interest or instrument commonly known as a
"security." 'n
In the landmark Supreme Court case of S.E.C.
v. W. J. Howey Co.1 2 the now famous Howey test
was born. The test, according to the Court, "is
whether the scheme involves an investment of
money in a common enterprise with profits to
come solely from the efforts of others."13
State courts, as well as federal courts, have
looked to the Howey test in determining whether a
particular interest constituted a security.1 4 Along
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the way, several questions of interpretation have
arisen. For example, the Howey test speaks of pro-
fits coming solely from the efforts of others. Read
literally, this test would exclude an interest in any
venture in which the investor's efforts con-
tributed-such as a franchise. Recognizing this, a
number of decisions have held that "solely" does
not really mean "solely." The best known decision
in this respect is S. E. C, v Glenn W. Turner Enter-
prises,' where the Ninth Circuit held that "the
word 'solely' should not be read as a strict or
literal limitation on the definition of an investment
contract."16 The Court realized that if the require-
ment were read in a mechanical fashion, "tilt
would be easy to evade by adding a requirement
that the buyer contribute a modicum of effort."17
The Court felt that the remedial aims of the
securities laws could be best served by adopting a
"more realistic test, whether the efforts made by
those other than the investor are the undeniably
significant ones, those essential managerial efforts
which affect the failure or success of the enter-
prise.""8
Another question of interpretation has involved
the meaning of the "common enterprise" require-
ment. Some courts have interpreted commonality
to require the existence of multiple investors and a
pro rata sharing of profits.1 Other courts have re-
jected the need for this horizontal commonality. 20
Instead, these courts have viewed the common
enterprise requirement as meaning nothing more
than the intertwining of the fortunes of the in-
vestor with the efforts and successes of either
those seeking the investment (the promoter) or of
third parties (other investors). 2 ' This approach ac-
cepts either horizontal or vertical commonality as
sufficient. Obviously, this approach is more in-
clusive than the first.
Thus, the Howey test has provided a basic
framework for the determination of whether a
transaction involves a security. Questions of its
interpretation have arisen which have generally
been resolved through analysis of the purposes of
the securities laws.
III. RECENT SUPREME COURT CASES
FINDING NO SECURITY
In recent years, the Supreme Court has con-
sidered several cases involving the issue of what is
a security. In United Housing Foundation, Inc. v
Forman," the Court decided that shares of stock
entitling a purchaser of the shares to lease an
apartment in a non-profit housing cooperative
were not securities. The shares of stock were non-
transferable and could descend only to a surviving
spouse. The Court rejected the notion that the
purchased interest must be considered a "security"
because it was represented by "stock" and because
the statutory definition includes the word
"stock."23 The Court stated that "[bjecause
securities transactions are economic in character
Congress intended the application of these statutes
to turn on the economic realities underlying a
transaction, and not on the name appended
thereto."14 The Court pointed out that the shares
involved had none of the characteristics com-
monly associated with a security in the commer-
cial world.25
The Court also rejected the idea that a share of
stock in the cooperative constituted an "invest-
ment contract." The Court stated that "there can
be no doubt that investors were attracted solely by
the prospect of acquiring a place to live, and not
by financial returns on their investments."2 6
In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v
DanielPl the Supreme Court decided that a com-
pulsory, noncontributory pension plan did not
constitute a "security" under the federal securities
laws. The Court stated that the test of whether a
financial relationship constitutes an "investment
contract" is the Howey test.28 The Court con-
tinued, however, saying that "[tihis test is to be
applied in light of 'the substance-the economic
realities of the transaction- rather than the names
that may have been employed by the parties.' "29
Applying the Howey test to the facts of the case,
the Court held, first, that there was no investment
of money30 and, second, that there was no expec-
tation of profits from a common enterprise.3 1 The
Court rejected the plaintiff-employee's argument
that he had invested in the pension fund by allow-
ing part of his compensation to be paid into it. The
Court held that "the purported investment [was] a
relatively insignificant part of an employee's total
and indivisible compensation package"32 and that
the "decision to accept and retain covered employ-
ment must have only an attenuated relationship, if
any, to perceived investment possibilities of a
future pension. "33
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The Court also found that the eligibility of an
employee for a pension under the plan in question
depended primarily on the employee's efforts to
meet the vesting requirements.3 4 Thus, any "pro-
fit" expected by an employee would be one based
primarily on his or her own efforts rather than on
the managerial efforts of the trustee.3 5
After proceeding through the Howey type
analysis, the Court turned, in Part IV of the opin-
ion," to an additional consideration. In this part
f the opinion, the Court noted the passage of the
Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974 and
liscussed briefly the thrust of this legislation. It
:hen stated:
The existence of this comprehensive legisla-
tion governing the use and terms of employee
pension plans severely undercuts all
arguments for extending the Securities Acts to
noncontributory, compulsory pension plans.
Congress believed that it was filling a
regulatory void when it enacted ERISA ....
Not only is the extension of the Securities Acts
by the court below unsupported by the langu-
age and history of these Acts, but in light of
ERISA it serves no general purpose.3 7
rhis theme, introduced as something of an after-
:hought, was to reappear in the Marine Bank
pinion.
IV. MARINE BANK V. WEAVER:
A BRIEF SUMMARY
Marine Bank v. Weaver" involved a couple
wvho purchased a $50,000 certificate of deposit
rom a bank. They then pledged the certificate,
which was partially insured by the Federal Deposit
nsurance Corporation, to the same bank to
;uarantee a $65,000 loan by the bank to a third
)arty. The quid pro quo for the loan guarantee
vas an agreement between the owners of the cer-
ificate and the third parties whereby the cer-
ificate owners were to receive 50 per cent of the
iet profits of the third parties' business and $100.
>er month for the duration of the guarantee. In
iddition, the certificate owners were given the
ight to veto future borrowing by the business,
ind were given the use, at the discretion of the.
hird parties, of a barn and pasture owned by the
>usiness.3
The business eventually went bankrupt, and the
bank indicated its intent to claim the pledged cer-
tificate of deposit. The certificate owners
thereupon sued the bank alleging, inter alia, a
violation of Securities Exchange Act §10 (b). They
alleged that the bank officers had represented that
the proceeds of the loan they were guaranteeing
would be used by the business as working capital.
Instead, the money was allegedly used in large
part to repay prior bank loans and cover an over-
drawn checking account. Additionally, it was
alleged that the bank officers were aware of but
did not disclose the business' poor financial condi-
tion.4 0
The District Court entered summary judgment
for the bank on the §10 (b) claim on the basis that
"if a wrong occurred it did not take place 'in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of any security,'
as required for liability under §10 (b)." 4 ' The
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that either the
certificate of deposit or the contract between the
certificate owners and the third parties could
reasonably be found by a fact finder to be a secur-
ity.42
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Ap-
peals. While recognizing that the definition of
"security" under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 is broad and that the term has been inter-
preted in an expansive manner, the Court stated:
The broad statutory definition is preceded,
however, by the statement that the terms
mentioned are not to be considered securities
if 'the context otherwise requires . .
Moreover, we are satisfied that Congress, in
enacting securities laws, did not intend to pro-
vide a broad federal remedy for all fraud.43
The Court held, first, that the certificate of
deposit was not a security. According to the
Court, bank certificates of deposit are signifi-
cantly different from other long-term debt obliga-
tions. The certificate of deposit in question "was
issued by a federally regulated bank which is sub-
ject to the comprehensive set of regulations
governing the bank industry."" The Court went
on to note that "deposits [in federally regulated
banks] are insured by the Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation. Since its formation in 1933,
nearly all depositors in failing banks insured by
FDIC have received payment in full, even pay-
ment for the portions of their deposits above the
'he Oklahoma Bar Journal 2201
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amount insured."4 These considerations led the
Court to conclude:
The definition of security in the 1934 Act pro-
vides that an instrument which seems to fall
within the broad sweep of the Act is not to be
considered a security if the context otherwise
requires. It is unnecessary to subject issuers of
bank certificates of deposit to liability under
the antifraud provisions of the federal
securities laws since the holders of bank cer-
tificates of deposit are abundantly protected
under the federal banking laws. We therefore
hold that the certificate of deposit [involved]
is not a security."'
The Court also held that the agreement between
the certificate holders and the third parties was not
a security. It felt that the agreement was "not the
type of instrument that comes to mind when the
term security is used . . . . . According to the
Court:
The unusual instruments found to constitute
securities in prior cases involved offers to a
number of potential investors, not a private
transaction as in this case. In Howey, for ex-
ample, 42 persons purchased interests in a
citrus grove during a four-month period. In C.
M. Joiner Leasing, offers to sell oil leases were
sent to over 1,000 prospects. In C. M. Joiner
Leasing, we noted that a security is an instru-
ment in which there is 'common trading.' The
instruments involved in C. M. Joiner Leasing
and Howey had equivalent values to most
persons and could have been publically trad-
ed.48
By comparison, the certificate of deposit owners
and the third parties had negotiated one-on-one a
unique agreement "not designed to be traded
publically."49
The Court's holding in Marine Bank v Weaver,
however, was expressly limited by the Court to
the facts of the case. The final footnote to the
opinion stated:
It does not follow a certificate of deposit or
business agreement between transacting par-
ties invariably falls outside the definition of a
security as defined by the federal statutes.
Each transaction must be analyzed and
evaluated on the basis of the content of the in-
struments in question, the purposes intended
to be served, and the factual setting as a
whole.50
V. MARINE BANK V. WEAVER:
SOME COMMENTS
The decision in Marine Bank v Weaver is in-
teresting in several respects. First, while the Court
mentioned the Howey case, it abstained from a
Howey type analysis as to the certificate of
deposit's status. Instead, it focused primarily on
the perceived lack of need for application of the
antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.
What makes this intriguing is that a number of
past lower federal court and state court decisions
can perhaps be best explained as attempts to use
the securities laws to fashion remedies where other
remedies may have been inadequate or
unavailable."
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Marine Bank can be viewed as the negative im-
age of these cases. It denied application of the
securities laws because other federal remedies and
safeguards were deemed adequate. The Court's
approach is reminiscent of Part IV of the Daniel
opinion, which the Court discussed in a footnote
to Marine Bank v Weaver." In Daniel, however,
the Court spoke of the lack of need for application
of the federal securities laws only after applying
the Howey test to the facts of the case.
Second, the Court indicated that the scope of
the federal securities laws is limited to those frauds
involving instruments having "equivalent values
to all persons"53 and the ability to be "traded
publically."54 The phraseology "equivalent
values" seems to connote some readily ascer-
tainable value which would facilitate trading of
the interest.
Accordingly, the Court refused to apply the
federal securities laws to a "unique agreement,
negotiated one-on-one by the parties."" Thus,
while the Court reaffirmed the applicability of the
antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws
to "uncommon and irregular instruments,"" it
seems willing to leave parties to unusual,
negotiated transactions to their remedies, if any,
under other laws.
CONCLUSION
The Marine Bank case will undoubtedly be
useful to attorneys in assessing potential remedies
for a foregone set of facts, as well as in evaluating
and structuring contemplated transactions. It pro-
vides some feeling for those contexts which may
be viewed by the Supreme Court as inappropriate
for application of the antifraud provisions of the
federal securities laws. These would likely include
transactions which are closely and more directly
regulated by other provisions of federal law and
unique, privately-negotiated agreements, interests
in which are not amenable to public trading.
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